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The Restrictive Covenant in Xanadu 
“In Xanadu did Kubla Khan 
A stately pleasure-dome decree “ 
S. T. Coleridge, 1816 
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Abstract 
Legal scholarship is naturally inclined towards explanations and justifications of 
contemporary law. In the case of restrictive covenants and building schemes this has led to a 
distorted perception of the historical record, as revealed in recorded case reports dating from 
the nineteenth century. It is argued that the restrictive covenant had its historical genesis not 
in a response to industrialisation and mass urbanisation, but in the developments of resort 
towns in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as a response to the needs of land 
developers. Furthermore, it is argued that a better historical understanding of these origins 
illuminates contemporary problems concerned with the adaptability of law and the potential 
roles of law in development.  
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In the first half of the nineteenth century the law of England and Wales came to recognise 
promises to restrict the use of land that bound strangers to the promise, covenants that could 
bind third parties.2 An interest that binds third parties is a property interest: as it operates 
beyond imposing personal obligations upon the parties to an agreement and affects strangers 
to the original transaction. Land has always been subject to some property interests effective 
against the holder of the land, such as easements including the right of way. However, the 
common law of England and Wales has always been wary of allowing too many such 
property interests, as they interfere with the development and alienation of land. For this 
reason the nineteenth century recognition of promises that bound third parties was remarkable, 
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because it violated important legal doctrines and ran against powerful currents of 
contemporary opinion. 
The novel property interest violated the doctrine of privity, the doctrine that restricted the 
effects of an agreement to the parties to that agreement. In this respect it went beyond the 
extended concept of ‘privity of estate’ that applied to leases, and which treated later tenants 
and later landlords as bound by the promises of the original tenants and landlords as 
contained in a lease.3 It ran against the judicial animosity towards the creation of novel 
interests in land. This reluctance to clutter the title to land was in full operation in the 
nineteenth century.4 It ran against the policy of freeing the effective powers of the landowner 
in possession in dealing with the land.5  Over time the promises capable of binding third 
parties became new interests in land known as “restrictive covenants” or “building schemes”. 
This article re-examines the origins of these legal developments and suggests that a faulty 
historical understanding is obstructing an understanding of the creative genius of the common 
law, a subject of some potential importance in the field of law and development. 
The traditional view of the origins of the restrictive covenant that has been widely held 
amongst legal scholars can be illustrated easily enough. “The real starting point … Tulk v 
Moxhay in 1848, a time when the full effect of the vast expansion in industrial and building 
activities was being felt”.6  “The social context from which it emerged is generally 
understood, that at a time of increasing population and increasing building activity, when 
there was virtually no public control of land use, private control by covenant was the only 
method of preserving amenity available to those landowners wishing to release land for 
development.” 7  “ … a body of law which proved to be, if not an unmixed blessing, yet of 
very great importance in regulating the urban development of the country before the 
introduction of modern planning legislation … “.8 All of these explanations seem to focus 
attention on 1848 and afterwards, the future at the time of the decision. However, the 
explanation for a novel practice, that has by 1848 become familiar to the cognoscenti, 
amongst conveyancers and Chancery judges, must lie in the past, and the social practices we 
need to attend to are more likely to be Regency than Victorian. 
It was not in urban squalor, nor in industrial development, nor in protecting the residential 
nature of private housing estates, that restrictive covenants have their historical origins. 
Rather, it was in the pleasure gardens and developments for leisure of the eighteenth and 
                                                          
3 As recognised in the cases by stating that the covenant does “not run with the land [at law]” or that it falls 
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early nineteenth century.9 Indubitable, the heyday of the restrictive covenant in the nineteenth 
century was tied up with “the best sort of urban development”,10 and conveyancing practice 
served to safeguard superior residential developments from social contagion.11 However, it 
was the more entrepreneurial and speculative development of leisure resorts, that first led to 
the commercially significant use of covenants constraining the use of freehold land.  The 
leisure resort industry took as its model the city of Bath, the paradigm leisure resort that 
encompassed facilities for:12 “eating and drinking, shopping and chit-chatting, dancing and 
card playing, revelling and horse racing, bathing and reading, gambling and whoring.” An 
idea of the scale of the early modern leisure industry is given by Neale’s estimate that the 
capital invested in house building in Bath in the eighteenth century was equivalent to the 
fixed capital invested in the English cotton industry in the same century.13 The restrictive 
covenant was the response of legal draftsmen to the demands generated by resort town 
development for a view, and “the general beauty of the … design” of the resort.14 
The cases that were seminal for the judicial development of the law in this area were atypical 
of the commercial practice that drove the same legal development. Thus, the legal scholar is 
introduced to restrictive covenants through cases concerned with the use of industrial land 
and urban residential land: the two seminal cases being Keppell v Bailey and Tulk v Moxhay.  
This is despite the fact that the predominant character of the cases reported over the formative 
period for the restrictive covenant and building scheme were concerned with leisure 
developments. Keppell v Bailey was concerned with a covenant in a partnership deed. The 
covenant promised the other parties to the deed, on behalf of the “heirs, executors, 
administrators, and assigns” of a leasehold ironworks, to procure limestone from a specific 
quarry, and to use a specific railway, at a specific toll, to transfer stone from that quarry.15 As 
such it was concerned with the co-ordinated running of industrial concerns, and finance of 
transport infrastructure; land use as far removed from the pleasure resort as can be imagined. 
Tulk v Moxhay was concerned with what we know as the central open space of Leicester 
Square in London. However, the covenant in Tulk v Moxhay was not merely to keep the area 
open and unbuilt upon.16 The original covenant was for a private park or garden, termed a 
“square garden and pleasure ground”. The garden was to be fenced, and the plants maintained, 
keys were to be available to the householders facing the Square for a fee, and certain features 
of the garden were prescribed. Thus, the case bears strong resemblance, on its facts, to the 
well known case of Re Ellenborough Park.17 However, it is far more conducive to teaching 
and learning to forget the positive aspects of the actual covenant in Tulk v Moxhay, because 
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the case then serves as a more credible root for the restrictive covenant. The injunction 
upheld on appeal in Tulk v Moxhay was interlocutory, and aimed to preserve the status quo, 
and for this purpose was negative or restrictive in effect, being limited to:18 “that which will 
protect these parties … [and] … not to impose any more restraints  ... than is necessary for 
that particular purpose.” Moreover, we cannot help imagining Leicester Square in the midst 
of a vast urban conurbation, and with or without its private garden the area was never a resort 
town.19 
More typical of the underlying practice are the cases decided between the decisions in 
Keppell v Bailey and Tulk v Moxhay: Whatman v Gisbson,20 Schrieber v Creed,21 and Mann v 
Stephens;22 each of which concerned resort towns. Not all of the intermediate cases were 
concerned with resort towns, Bristow v Wood concerned land near Liverpool.23 Obviously, 
the legal practice of using covenants in resort town developments also led to cases post-Tulk 
v Moxhay such as: Coles v Sims,24 Western v Macdermott,25 and Sheppard v Gilmore.26 The 
argument is that the flurry of cases that followed Keppell v Bailey are indicative of the earlier 
practices that Lord Brougham’s judgment in Keppell v Bailey threatened. Furthermore, that a 
sampling of later cases confirms a vigorous earlier legal practice of covenanting to restrict 
land use connected to the development of resort towns, a practice that long preceded the 
judicial legitimisation of the restrictive covenant as an interest capable of binding property in 
Tulk v Moxhay. 
The peculiarity of the seminal cases, and the more general use of restrictive covenants in the 
context of nineteenth century urbanisation, have created a misleading perception of the 
restrictive covenant as called into being to answer the problems of urban development. It is 
usual to imply or assert a rather odd future functional explanation for the recognition of the 
restrictive covenant: that in 1848 the courts condoned a practice responding to the problems 
of industrial urbanisation. However, the fact was that the litigation of the time (1834-1848) 
was primarily concerned with the conveyances of a generation before. It is the legal practice 
of the legal profession a generation before that needs explanation, not the legitimating action 
of the court of Chancery in 1848. It is legal practice that leads and case law that follows. Our 
familiar accounts reverse the locus of causality. It is not judges but lawyers who are 
generating the novel law. The judges either condone or condemn retrospectively. Also, it is 
                                                          
18 (1848) 11 Beavan 571; 50 ER 937 at 586 and 944. 
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University Press, 2012). 
20 (1838) 9 Sim 196; 59 ER 333: a 1799 scheme in Ramsgate. 
21 (1839) 10 Sim 9; 59 ER 515: an 1827 scheme in Cheltenham. 
22 (1846) 15 Sim 377; 60 ER 665: an 1838 deed similar to Tulk v Moxhay in Gravesend. 
23 (1844) 1 Coll 480; 63 ER 508. 
24 (1853) Kay 56; 69 ER 25: an 1823 scheme in Cheltenham. 
25 (1866) LR 2 Ch App 72: a 1766 scheme in Bath. 
26 (1887) 57 LJ Ch 6: the same 1766 scheme as in Bath. 
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likely that the judges had more of an eye to the disruption that would be caused by unsettling 
earlier titles than to the potential future beneficial uses of the restrictive covenant.27  
Certainly rhetorically at least the ordinariness of enforcing such covenants controlling land 
use against successors in title was stressed by Lord Cottenham LC in Tulk v Moxhay:28 
“I have no doubt whatever upon the subject; in short, I cannot have a doubt upon 
it, without impeaching what I have considered as the settled rule of this Court 
ever since I have known it. Where the owner of a piece of land enters into a 
contract with his neighbour, founded, of course, upon valuable or other good 
consideration, that he will either use or abstain from using his land in such a 
manner as the other party by the contract particularly specifies, it appears to me 
the very foundation of the whole of this jurisdiction, to maintain that this Court 
has authority to enforce such a contract. It has never, that I know of been 
disputed.” 
Which established the binding nature of the promise to restrict land use between the parties, 
and:29 
“it [the Court of Chancery] has always acted upon this principle, that you, who 
have the property, are bound by the principles and law of this Court to submit to 
the contract you have entered into; and you will not be permitted to hand over 
that property, and give to your assignee or your vendee a higher title, with regard 
to interest as between yourself and your vendor, than you yourself possess.” 
Which tied the promise to title, by invoking the principle of nemo dat quod non habet.  As 
George has pointed out this assertion of regularity would have been audacious if the practice 
was not accepted in the profession, and the Third Report of the Real Property Commissioners 
in 1832 is supportive of the argument that this was a common practice well before Tulk v 
Moxhay.30  
A better candidate for the gestation of this legal practice than the problems of industrial and 
urban development, as suggested by the seminal cases, is the development of the resort town. 
The litigation between the legal milestones is illuminating.  
Whatman v Gisbson concerned an eighteenth century development in Ramsgate.31 In the 
words of Chalklin: “Primarily as resorts Brighton, Margate and Ramsgate were pre-eminent 
in 1801”.32 The case concerned a deed dated 1799, and drawn up prior to the sale of land in 
parts. The deed stipulated the site of future buildings, some requirements as to the form of the 
                                                          
27 See: George (1990) 183. 
28 (1848) 1 Hall & Twells 105, 47 ER 1345 at 111-112 & 1347. 
29 Ibid. at 114 & 1348. 
30 George (1990) 183; Parliamentary Papers 1832 (484) XXIII, 321. 
31 (1838) 9 Sim 196; 59 ER 333. 
32 C. W. Chalklin, ‘South-East’ in P. Clark (ed), The Cambridge Urban History of Britain vol ii (Cambridge: 
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buildings, maintenance of an open area between the buildings and the cliff edge, and 
restrictions on the use of the buildings, specifically as dwelling-houses or lodging houses and 
not, inter alia, as “family hotel and inn and tavern”. The relevant clauses of the deed are 
reproduced in the report, and it is quite plain that the intention was to form a row of houses or 
lodging houses with a sea-view, and to exclude any industrial or public trade, thus keeping 
the row respectable.  There was no dispute as to the terms of the deed, nor that the intended 
user by the defendant’s lessee would be in violation of the terms of the deed, nor that the 
defendant and his lessee had notice of the deed and its terms. However, the defendant had not 
become a party to the deed, and the case was argued on the basis there was no privity that 
could bind the defendant. The judgment was for the plaintiff on the ground that: 33 “I see no 
reason why such an agreement should not be binding in equity on the parties so coming in 
with notice. Each proprietor is manifestly interested in having all the neighbouring houses 
used in such a way as to preserve the general uniformity and respectability of the row”. The 
row of houses, called Nelson Crescent, remains, and commands a view overlooking the 
Marina. 
Schreiber v Creed concerned a famous leisure development in Cheltenham.34 Cheltenham 
was a resort town that enjoyed spectacular growth in the early nineteenth century,35 and the 
case was concerned with a development in the Cheltenham area that originated with a deed 
executed in 1827.  It is worth dwelling upon Schreiber v Creed and the man whose schemes 
formed the basis for the case, one Joseph Pitt who founded Pittville in Cheltenham in the 
1820s as a residential district and spa with pleasure gardens and a pump house.36  Joseph Pitt 
had been an attorney in Cirencester, and Pittville was an investment of the wealth he secured 
from his legal practice.  Pitt did not attempt to finance the building of the whole of Pittville. 
Rather, he undertook to build and maintain the infra-structure and pump room, and sold off 
building lots to investors, who bought subject to restrictions on what and where they could 
build. He structured the relationships between himself as developer and manager of the estate 
and the individual purchasers, and that between the purchasers inter se, through a deed 
executed in 1827 by Pitt and initial purchasers.37 Later purchasers were made party to the 
deed upon purchase. 
In Schreiber v Creed the plaintiff attempted to prevent the defendant from building forward 
of a building line his vendor had agreed to respect, claiming it would obstruct his view, and 
diminish the value of his house. Schreiber had purchased from Stokes, and Creed had 
purchased from Pitt. Originally Stokes had contracted to purchase both the plots owned by 
the parties to the action, and had entered into various covenants in a deed of 1833 with Pitt. 
However, he had been unable to fund the building and had given up all his rights to the plot 
eventually acquired by Creed. Unsurprisingly, Shadwell VC refused to enforce on Pitt the 
covenants made by Stokes to Pitt in 1833. The direction of the obligation was wrong. The 
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substance of the covenants Pitt entered into in the 1827 deed expressly gave him the power to 
vary the original plans, and did not actually give any assurance as to the building lines for any 
plots, including that of Schreiber. Therefore, the motion was dismissed, although not on any 
argument based on Keppell v Bailey or the impossibility of covenants running with the land. 
The pump room still stands in a small park, it is a Grade 1 listed building. 
Before leaving Schreiber v Creed it is worth noting that the 1827 deed provided for the 
payment of service fees by the purchasers, and for the parties to the deed to “concur” with 
Pitt in seeking a Private Act of Parliament.38 Pitt was using the 1827 deed, deliberately not 
following the precedent of joint-stock partnership deeds,39 to provide for “the general 
regulation and management of the Pittville estate”.40 Pitt was willing to use the deed, but he 
was clearly aware of the risk that he would have to resort to Parliament if the 1827 deed was 
not fully effective. A Private Act would have been more secure, but also a lot more expensive. 
Pitt was clearly well aware of the contemporary facilitative options open to a land developer. 
The final resort town case is Mann v Stephens which concerned land in Gravesend.41 
Gravesend was a major destination for day-trippers from London. Chalkin reports:42 “By the 
1820’s the steamboat carried artisan day trippers on summer holidays numbering 30,000 – 
300,000 to Gravesend. Sleeping in the open began here and there were over a million 
passengers by 1840.” The report is very brief but Mann v Stevens appears to be a clear 
example of an injunction awarded to enforce a covenant against an assignee of the covenantor 
in favour of a person who derived title from a covenantee; a decision only explicable by the 
obligation running with the two plots of land. The original land was divided into four plots, 
upon which three houses were built and an open area preserved for their amenity. The action 
was by an owner of one of the house against the purchaser of the open area, who was 
building a beer-shop and brewery upon the open area in breach of the covenant. The first 
instance decision by Shadwell VC was confirmed by Cottenham LC.43 
The sole remaining case of note between 1834 and 1848 was Bristow v Wood, which is 
poorly reported and did not concern a resort town.44 The case concerned a field near to 
Liverpool. Notice of the existence of a covenant which restricted the value of buildings to be 
erected upon the field was treated as raising sufficient doubt that the purchaser was able to 
escape the contract which was expressly made “free from incumbrances”.45  
Thus, three out of four cases concerned with the enforcement of covenants constraining the 
use of land following Keppell v Bailey originated from resort towns.  In none of the four 
cases was Keppell v Bailey applied, and they all proceeded on the basis that covenants may 
                                                          
38 Ibid. at 13 & 518. 
39 Ibid. at 33-34 & 526. 
40 Ibid. at 15 & 519: the quote is from the recital of the 1833 deed. 
41 (1846) 15 Sim 377; 60 ER 377. 
42 Chalklin (2000) 65. 
43 Ibid. 
44 (1844) 1 Coll 480; 63 ER 508. 
45 Ibid. 
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be enforced in equity against subsequent owners. However, all except Bristow v Wood, which 
was decided by Knight-Bruce VC, were decided at first instance by Shadwell VC, and we 
cannot be sure how representative his views were of the general legal community. That the 
practice of imposing covenants that purported to bind land was common before 1834 is 
demonstrated by the findings of the Third Report of the Real Property Commissioners, who 
noted that: “These covenants being of frequent occurrence, and of great importance” were 
problematic because: “It does not very clearly appear under what impression as to their effect 
such covenants have been introduced or sanctioned by practitioners”.46  The Commissioners 
recommended that the covenants should be enforceable in equity. Following Tulk v Moxhay 
such covenants were enforced in equity. Subsequently the law was developed in such a way 
that the restrictive covenant and the building scheme came to be treated as different in nature, 
and the restrictive covenant was limited in various ways, and was eventually recognised as a 
full interest in land.47  
Resort towns also featured in reported litigation subsequent to Tulk v Moxhay. It is worth 
noting Western v MacDermot48 and Sheppard v Gilmore49 which are both concerned with the 
same deed of 1766 dealing with an eighteenth century development of land in Bath. Also 
Cole v Sims50 is of some interest, being concerned with another scheme in Cheltenham, and a 
deed from 1823. Thus they confirm the importance of covenants in deeds drawn up to 
regulate the uses of land in resort town developments prior to the judicial legitimisation of the 
practice. The case for the development of resort towns being a significant, if not predominant, 
factor in the growing practice of imposing limitations and obligations upon the use of land 
has been made out. As is apparent from the quotations above (nn. 6-8); that traditional 
accounts of the origins of the restrictive covenant place emphasis on the importance of the 
interest in the face of industrialisation, and pressures upon residential urban spaces due to 
mass urbanisation. From the review of the reported cases it is clear that this emphasis is 
anachronistic, and that it was the development of urban space for leisure that was the source 
of the practice that led to judicial recognition of the restrictive covenant. 
This shift in attention highlights an often neglected feature of the early law and practice that 
led to the recognition of the restrictive covenant and the building scheme. Considered in the 
context of the land developments that gestated the covenant binding upon subsequent owners 
of land we are not concerned with the protection of amenity under threat from burgeoning 
urban and industrial development. We are concerned with ambitious and speculative 
entrepreneurial activity, pushing the traditional boundaries of law. Leisure resorts demanded 
protected views, despite the well established legal authorities that denied the possibility of an 
easement for a view,51 and the legal draftsmen wrote deeds designed to preserve views.52 The 
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48 (1866) LR 1 Eq 499. 
49 (1887) 57 LJ Ch 6. 
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51 William Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b; 77 ER 816. 
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law is developed dialectically. An easement for a view threatened to smother land 
development. However, with the new social and economic forces developing in the leisure 
industry, land development needed to secure the visual amenities of an area. A view was no 
longer merely a thing of delight:53  
“Wray, Chief Justice, then said, that for stopping as well of the wholesome air (b) 
as of light, an action lies, and damages shall be recovered for them, for both are 
necessary … But he said, that for (c) prospect, which is a matter only of delight, 
and not of necessity, no action lies for stopping thereof (D), and yet it is a great 
commendation of a house if it has a long and large prospect … But the law does 
not give an action for such things of delight.” 
A view was now a commercially necessary feature of the leisure development. A legal rule 
that had promoted development now threatened to undermine development. The 
conveyancers used covenants to meet the needs of the clients. The Court of Chancery 
legitimised the practice because it was sensible and limited. The form of the covenant 
guaranteed that there was no prescriptive threat, that the land subject to the covenants was 
identifiable, and that the extent of the restrictions was express in the covenants. When 
conveyancers drafted deeds that were executed by numerous parties with all due formality, 
and money was spent in reliance of the efficacy of the deeds, then the Chancery assumed that 
the deeds were intended to have a significant effect upon the legal relations of the parties. 
Hence in Schreiber v Creed one argument raised and considered was that the deeds must 
have intended to give Creed an action, as otherwise the whole documentation would be “a 
bubble”. The judgment devotes a long paragraph to this argument, concluding:54 
“I do not think that this deed can be justly characterised as a mere bubble, there 
being sufficient in the corpus of it to enable all those who should have an interest 
in the land to prevent Mr. Pitt, his heirs and assigns, if they should be so foolishly 
inclined, from perverting this Pittville estate to any other purpose than that to 
which the mere contemplation of the plan shews it was intended to be 
appropriated.” 
The court is seeking to give effect to the commercial intentions informing the deed upon 
which the parties to the deed have relied. The assumption is that a legitimate intention will be 
given effect to, if possible, by the equity court. 
The origins of the restrictive covenant and building scheme are more similar in this respect to 
the familiar commercial pressures on legal forms than to planning law. In the late twentieth 
century legal draftsmen were pushing the boundaries of company security with the fixed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
52 Whatman v Gibson (1838) 9 Sim 196; 59 ER 333; Schreiber v Creed (1839) 10 Sim 9; 59 ER 515; Western v 
MacDermot (1866) LR 1 Eq 499 and Sheppard v Gilmore (1887) 57 LJ Ch 6 (same scheme). Gilbert v Spoor 
[1983] Ch 27 confirms the continuing vitality of the covenant for a view. 
53 (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b; 59 ER 816 at 58b & 821. 
54 (1839) 10 Sim 9; 59 ER 515 at 36-37 & 527. 
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charge over book debts.55 Eventually the courts refused to give judicial sanction to the use of 
the fixed charges, after a period of doubt.56 This process is analogous to the one evidenced by 
the history of the restrictive covenant, except the courts validated the restrictive covenant 
after a period of doubt. The processes are also ones of relatively small numbers of experts in 
the field resolving issues over time. It has the marks of an expert community converging on a 
solution over time, rather than the imprint of any dominant mind determining the outcome. 
This process of incremental and tentative change is, of course, the genius of the common law. 
In the nineteenth century it is also an aspect of the generational renewal of the chancery 
bench. 
One noteworthy feature in the reported cases is the social roles that were filled by the same 
individuals across time. Thus, Joseph Pitt was both attorney and land developer. Knight-
Bruce, counsel in Schreiber v Creed,57  was later judge in Bristow v Wood.58  E. B. Sugden 
was counsel in Keppell v Bailey.59  He was also the writer of Vendors and Purchasers, an 
influential work that maintained a faith in the validity of using covenants to control land use 
despite the decision of Lord Chancellor Brougham in Keppell v Bailey.60 He eventually 
became Lord Chancellor himself, as Lord St Leonard. Thus the entrepreneur was providing 
legal services before moving into land development, his counsel who argued for the validity 
of covenants became a judge who upheld the validity of covenants. The unsuccessful counsel 
in Keppell v Bailey kept the faith in his writing (and presumably in his legal practice, by way 
of advice and when drafting deeds for clients) and eventually himself became the preeminent 
equity judge of his time. One reason this system of entrepreneur, lawyers, and equity judges 
was responsive to the demands of land developers was the close relationship, approaching at 
times identity, of the various social actors.61  Having lawyers who act for commercial clients 
and eventually become judges (rather than separate career paths for counsel and advisers and 
judges) greatly facilitates the transmission of information from economic actors to legal 
decision makers. The advisors and drafters of one generation become the judges who rule 
upon the validity of those drafts in the next generation.62 
                                                          
55 Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142. 
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Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200 and In re New Bullas Trading Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC are from the period of doubt. 
57 (1839) 10 SIm 9; 59 ER 515. 
58 (1844) 1 Coll 480; 63 ER 508, and in De Mattos v Gibson (1859) De G & J 276; 45 ER 108. 
59 (1834) 2 My & K 517; 39 ER 1042. 
60 10th ed 1839 ii, 495-506, cited by Anderson (2010) 171. 
61 Y. Dotan ‘The Global Language of Human Rights: Patterns of Cooperation between State and Civil Rights 
Lawyers in Israel’ in A. Sarat and S. Scheingold (eds), Cause Lawyering and the State in  a Global Era (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001) 244; and P. J. Woods, ‘Cause Lawyers and Judicial Community in Israel: Legal 
Change in a Diffuse Normative Community’ in A. Sarat and S. Schiengold (eds), The Worlds Cause Lawyers 
Make (Stanford, Ca: Stanford Law and Politics, 2005) 307 illustrate similar effects of close legal communities 
with alternating memberships over time on legal development in a contemporary setting, and similar 
legitimacy problems being generated. 
62 Obviously, the habit of appointing judges from the most highly paid (successful) advocates of their 
generation who are overwhelmingly acting for commercial interests generates a legitimacy problem that is 
familiar. The classic analysis is J. A. G. Griffiths, The Politics of the Judiciary (London: Fontana Press, 1997). 
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This institutional tradition, of raising advocates from the legal profession to the Bench, rather 
than having differential training for advocates and judges is an often overlooked possible 
source for the developmental successes of the common law.63 It is also one potential source 
for the differential developmental outcomes found when one looks closely at common law 
jurisdictions, differences as wide as those between civil law and common law systems.64 It is 
the type of complexity that Douglass C. North alerts us to in his work on economic change.65 
A legal system is rules and courts and enforcement mechanisms; thus, it includes formal 
institutions.  However, it is also informal understandings, knowledge communities and social 
rituals; it includes informal institutions. The problem law has to overcome is uncertainty, and 
law itself can generate uncertainly. 
In general terms the problem addressed by use of covenants was a classic problem of 
uncertainty, uncertainty regarding the possible behaviour of future owners of neighbouring 
land. The problem was aggravated by the prior development of relatively unrestricted rights 
of ownership and relatively free land markets, the institutional solutions in turn for past 
uncertainties, the classic situation described by North. The problem was most keenly felt 
when developing land for leisure use. However, the general nature of the problem is not 
restricted to resort towns. Once the character of a neighbourhood is established, and 
supported by the personal obligations of the neighbours to each other, then a newcomer is in 
a position to hold his neighbours to ransom unless the newcomer can be bound by the 
obligations that bind the existing landowners. Thus, we have a hold out problem whenever a 
plot of land is sold. One possible solution would be to prevent the transfer of ownership 
without the agreement of the neighbourhood. However, this would impose serious transaction 
costs and interfere with the principle of free alienation of land. If the limitation on land use 
can be imposed on the land, so that it will bind a newcomer to the neighbourhood, then the 
community can protect itself from the risk of being held to ransom by any newcomer without 
interfering with the transferability of the plots of land. 
The importance of the institutional forces at work which are not at the level of formal 
institutions is brought home by the ultimate ineffectiveness of Keppell v Bailey. North 
informs us that these features of the development of the law are of interest and indeed may be 
amongst the most important aspects of the story. It was the relationship between the lawyers 
and their clients, and the relationship between generations of lawyers and judges, and the 
experience of the equity jurisdiction that together provided the institutional features of the 
situation in which the law developed.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
However, the problem here is that not all social interests are represented adequately or at all, rather than that 
some overwhelmingly are represented 
63 John Reitz, Legal Origins, Comparative Law, and Political Economy (2009) 57 Am. J, Comp. L. 847; Paul 
Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right (2001) 30 J. Legal Studies 503. 
64 Ronald J Daniels, Michael J. Trebilcock, and Lindsey D. Carson, The Legacy of Empire: The Common law 
Inheritance and Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies (2011) 59 Am. J. Comp. L. 111. 
65 D.C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990); D.C. North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2005). 
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From the point of view of analysis based on North an essential advantage of this close 
relationship between today’s lawyers and tomorrows judges is that an awareness of the 
informal institutional features of the system will be present in the guardians of the formal 
institutions. Rules will be formed in the light of effectiveness in practice because they are 
being propounded by judges who are familiar with that practice. George concluded the same 
from her review of the history of the doctrine in Tulk v Moxhay:66 
“ It is submitted that, while there may have been some legal foundation for the 
rules which developed, they were essentially formulated as a matter of public 
policy to give “business efficacy” to long standing arrangements. It matters not 
what the foundation is thought to be; if the result is desirable the injunctions will 
be awarded.” 
In this passage she recognised one of the great strengths of the common law system in terms 
of economic development illustrated by the history of the restrictive covenant. The very idea 
of ‘business efficacy’ is one that looks to the interplay of informal and formal norms in 
practice, and that prioritises support of reasonable expectations over elegance of legal rule or 
systemic orderliness. The common law is remarkable because it holds the tensions: between 
commercial interests and the public interest; between principle and pragmatism; between 
respect for the past and openness to novel demands; the history of the restrictive covenant 
reveals how these tensions are mediated into a creative impulse; we might say:67 
“It was a miracle of rare device, 
A sunny pleasure-dome with caves of ice!” 
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